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PSYCHOLOGICAL HARM UNDER NEPA
Over the course of time, man has made continuously increasing de-
mands on the environment.' Growing concern over both protecting man
and his limited natural resources and developing alternative sources of en-
ergy prompted Congress to enact legislation ensuring consideration of
these competing interests.' The National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA)3 and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA)4 reflect this in-
tent. NEPA, addressed generally to all federal agencies,5 requires environ-
1. See generally R. WALLACE, BIOLOGY, THE WORLD OF LIFE 524 (3d ed. 1981); E.
KELLER, ENVIRONMENTAL GEOLOGY 3-4 (1976); S.L. UDALL, THE QUIET CRISIS (1963);
Moncrief, The Cultural Basis for Our Environmental Crisis, 170 SCIENCE 508-12 (1970);
White, The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis, 155 SCIENCE 1203-07 (1967); Yi-Fu,
Our Treatment of the Environment in Ideal and Actuality, 58 AM. ScI. 244-49 (1970).
2. Several statutes exhibit the legislature's commitment to protecting the environment
from harm. See, e.g., Environmental Education Act, Pub. L. No. 91-516, 84 Stat. 1312
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1531 (1971)); Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat.
685 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)); Environmental
Quality Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 114, (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4371-4374
(1971)); Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (codified at
33 U.S.C. § 466 (1976)). The promulgating section of the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 (NEPA), Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4331
(1976 & Supp. III 1979)), states that
The Congress . . . recognizing further the critical importance of restoring and
maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare and development of man,
declares that it is the continuing policy of the federal government to foster and
promote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and
nature can live in productive harmony and fulfill the social, economic, and other
requirements of present and future generations of Americans.
(emphasis added).
3. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4361 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980)).
4. The original Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755 (1946),
dealt with military applications primarily because no civilian programs were in existence.
The 1954 Act, technically an amendment to the 1946 Act, incorporated civilian uses of
atomic energy. Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1976)).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1976) ("All agencies of the Federal Government shall
."); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1976). NEPA was applied to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic
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mental impact statements (EIS)6 to be prepared where there are "major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment."7 The AEA, directed specifically to the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission (NRC),8 permits the issuance of an operating license only upon
"reasonable assurance" that health and safety will be adequately
protected. 9
Passage of NEPA and AEA led to judicial participation in the realm of
environmental protection.' 0 Courts intervened to interpret the purpose
and scope of both NEPA and AEA when disputes arose over what impacts
should be cognizable under each statute. No definitive test has emerged.
Some courts have distinguished impacts on the basis of whether they have
Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C Cir. 1971) (action challenging the AEC rules promul-
gated to govern consideration of environmental matters).
6. An EIS is a detailed statement to be prepared by an agency involved in a significant
federal action. The purpose of an EIS is to aid agencies in their decisionmaking process and
advise other interested agencies and the public of the environmental consequences of a pro-
posed federal action. The EIS must accompany the proposal throughout the review process,
and copies must be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality
and the public. It must include environmental impacts, adverse effects, alternatives, long
term versus short term gains, actual resources committed, and expert opinions where avail-
able from other agencies. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976); see Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm., Inc., 449 F.2d at 1114-18. A threshold determination of significance (i.e., a signifi-
cant impact on the environment) must be made before an EIS is required. See Hanly v.
Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cer. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972) (Hanly I); Hanly v. Klein-
dienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cer. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973) (Hanly II).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). Congress vested the individual agencies with broad
discretion to make a good faith determination of conduct significant enough to require an
EIS. Hanly II, 471 F.2d at 828-30. See, e.g., Como-Falcon Community Coalition, Inc. v.
United States Dep't of Labor, 609 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1979) (establishment of job corps center
related solely to socioeconomic conditions with no allegation that there would be significant
impact on "human environment" as defined in NEPA; no EIS had to be prepared), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980); Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v.
United States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (storm or oil runoff, traffic
problems, and distinct changes in types of land use all trigger an EIS); National Org. for the
Reform of Marijuana Laws v. United States Dep't of State, 452 F. Supp. 1226, 1232 (D.D.C.
1978) (department must prepare an EIS with respect to United States' participation in herbi-
cide spraying of marijuana and poppy plants in Mexico because of potential health hazards
associated with contaminated marijuana).
8. The Energy Recovery Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 5814 (1976)) abolished the Atomic Energy Commission, and all functions of the
Commission were transferred to and vested in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the
Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration.
9. Save Our Invaluable Land (SOIL), Inc. v. Needham, 542 F.2d 539, 543 (10th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977). All nuclear facilities must be granted an operating
license by the NRC prior to commencing operation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) (1976). See
also People Against Nuclear Energy (PANE) v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
678 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
10. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d at 1109, 1111.
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a primary or secondary effect on the environment" while others have clas-
sified impacts based on their quantifiability or objectivity. 12 Applying the
traditional definition of health and safety, courts have included physical
harms to human health and the environment within the protection of
NEPA and AEA, but have excluded any allegations of psychological
harm.' 3 In People Against Nuclear Energy (PANE) v. United States Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission," the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit upheld the narrow construction of AEA, but
potentially broadened the scope of NEPA by recognizing psychological
harm as an impact.
On March 28, 1979, mechanical malfunctions inside Three Mile Island
nuclear power reactor unit No. 2 (TMI-2) at the electric generating station
of Metropolitan Edison Company were compounded by operators' errors
in attempting to correct those malfunctions. The resulting accident created
the possibility of release of radioactive materials, potential core meltdown,
and danger of a hydrogen explosion.' 5 Shortly after the accident at TMI-
2, the NRC ordered unit No. I (TMI-1) to remain in cold shutdown 6
pending an investigation of the reactor's safety. 7 PANE and others inter-
vened in the restart proceedings,' 8 requesting the NRC to consider psycho-
11. See infra notes 41-58 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 59-87 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec. Workers, 367 U.S.
396 (1961); First Nat'l Bank v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369, 1380 n.13 (7th Cir. 1973) ("As
regards public 'sensibilities' . . . we question whether such factors, even if amenable to
quantification, are properly cognizable in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that
the safety of the neighborhood is in fact jeopardized."); New Hampshire v. Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969); Monarch Chem. Works,
Inc. v. Exon, 466 F. Supp. 639, 657 (D. Neb. 1979) ("NEPA does not require an evaluation
of the psychological and sociological effects of a prison on people who live nearby."); Trinity
Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044, 1078-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
("[Clommunity attitudes and fears, or the propensity of certain economic or racial groups to
commit anti-social behavior ... are not required in a NEPA study."), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1975).
14. 678 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1982) cert. granted sub non. Metropolitan Edison Co. v.
PANE, 103 S. Ct. 292 (1982). Oral argument was heard March 1, 1983.
15. See The Wash. Post, Mar. 30, 1979 at Al, col. 2 and at A2, col. 1; TIME, Apr. 9,
1979, at 8.
16. At the time of the accident, TMI-I, the other nearly identical reactor on the same
site, was shut down for scheduled maintenance and refueling. The NRC ordered TMI-1 to
remain in shutdown even though it was undamaged by the accident. PANE, 678 F.2d at
223.
17. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), 10
N.R.C. 141, 148 (1979).
18. For a description of the restart proceedings, see infra notes 99-103 and accompany-
ing text.
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logical stress and community stability factors 19 before deciding whether to
restart TMI-1.20 The NRC declined to consider either." It concluded that
the undamaged reactor could be restarted without preparation of a supple-
mental EIS22 considering these issues. PANE filed a petition directly to
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to
challenge this decision.23
The divided opinion of the court of appeals reflects the controversial
nature of its decision. A three judge panel decided the NEPA and AEA
questions separately. Judge Wright's opinion, with the concurrence of Se-
nior Judge McGowan, became the opinion of the court on the NEPA ques-
tion. He held that psychological stress is cognizable under NEPA because
"post-traumatic anxieties, accompanied by physical effects and caused by
fears of recurring catastrophe" have an impact on the health of human
beings. 4 Any federal action that might have a significant affect on health,
including psychological health, triggers the preparation of an EIS. On the
NEPA issue, the court remanded the record to the NRC to make a thresh-
old determination of whether the changed circumstances at TMI required
preparation of a supplemental EIS.25
Judge Wilkey's dissent on the NEPA issue excluded psychological harm
from the definition of health. He argued that fear, like esthetics, is an indi-
vidual matter, and the majority's analysis sets no consistent standard to
19. PANE contended that restart of TMI-I would "damage the stability, cohesiveness,
and well-being of the neighboring communities because it would perpetuate loss of citizen
confidence in community institutions and would discourage economic growth." PANE, 678
F.2d at 224.
20. The commission had limited the scope of its investigation to technical, managerial
and operational evaluations. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,
Unit No. 1), 10 N.R.C. 141 (1979).
21. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), 12 N.R.C.
607 (1980). Only four of the five commissioners voted. The split decision effectively rejected
the Licensing Board's recommendation that, under NEPA, psychological distress and com-
munity stability should be considered. The Licensing Board then continued its hearings and
determined that the preparation of an EIS was unnecessary. See infra notes 99-102 and
accompanying text. This Note focuses solely on the psychological impact issue although the
court does discuss the community stability allegation.
22. For discussion of when a supplemental EIS is required and what it must include, see
40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(i) (1981); see also PANE, 678 F.2d at 233.
23. PANE contended that under NEPA and AEA the NRC had to consider "potential
harms to psychological health and community well-being." PANE, 678 F.2d at 223.
24. Id at 230.
25. Id at 226. The agency in charge of the proposed action is responsible for making
the threshold determination of whether an action significantly affects the quality of the
human environment so as to require an EIS. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). See Hanly v.
Kleindienst (Hanly II), 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); Mon-
arch Chem. Works, Inc. v. Exon, 466 F. Supp. 639 (D. Neb. 1979).
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determine when a fear is "real and justifiable."26 Judge Wilkey claimed
that the majority's decision will put the NRC in the position of analyzing
not only risks but how people perceive those risks.27 Ultimately, he main-
tained, the decision would expose every agency, not just the NRC, to
charges of potential psychological harm. The result would be that virtu-
ally any allegation of fear effectively could prevent any federal action until
an EIS is prepared.2"
While finding psychological health to be within the parameters of
NEPA, the court did not find it to be within the definition of health under
AEA.29 Judge Wilkey, joined by Judge McGowan, formed the majority
on the AEA question. Judge Wilkey's opinion relied primarily on legisla-
tive history. He reasoned that the narrow focus of the AEA reflected Con-
gress's intent to limit the construction of "health and safety" strictly to the
special hazards presented by radioactivity.3 ° Since post-traumatic psycho-
logical stress can result from any traumatic event, it is not a special hazard
contemplated by AEA.3'
This Note will evaluate the PANE decision by comparing it with the
legislative intent manifest in NEPA and the prior judicial decisions inter-
preting NEPA. The court's controversial decision to treat psychological
harm as cognizable under NEPA sets precedent in an area of first impres-
sion and expands the scope of the Act. Analyzing the significant potential
effects of this decision, this Note concludes that the PANE Court properly
interpreted the scope of NEPA and that its decision will enhance NEPA's
goal of encouraging beneficial uses of our environment by informing and
educating agency decisionmakers and the public.
I. NEPA POLICIES AND GOALS
By enacting NEPA, Congress intended to establish a comprehensive
federal policy of protecting both man and the natural environment.32 In
26. 678 F.2d at 242 (Wilkey, J, dissenting).
27. Id at 242.
28. Judge Wilkey condemned the court's prerequisites to NEPA consideration of psy-
chological harm as unjustified. He questioned whether susceptibility to psychological stress
could be engendered only in "post-traumatic" events. Id at 241-44 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 254.
30. Id at 255-56 (citing H.R. REP. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1954); S. REP. No.
1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1954); S. REP. No. 1211, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1335 (1946); H.R.
REP. No. 2478, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1946)).
31. 678 F.2d at 252.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 433 1(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See supra note 2. See also H. REP.
No. 378, 91st Cong., !st Sess., reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2751; S. REP.
No. 52, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 859. See
i.fra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
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the promulgating section of the statute, Congress manifested its desire to
encourage beneficial uses of resources without creating adverse impacts
that outweigh the advantages of the proposed action.33 The procedural
section also reflects this intent to protect the interest of society in the fed-
eral decisionmaking process by weighing competing factors. When an EIS
is triggered, the decisionmaker's analysis resembles a cost-benefit analy-
sis. 34 Federal agencies conducting such an analysis must pursue an inter-
disciplinary approach implementing innovative methods and procedures
designed to permit consideration of a variety of factors. 35 Title II of the
Act created the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), a separate
agency designed exclusively to aid regulatory agencies in interpreting and
fulfilling the requirements of NEPA.36
NEPA differs significantly in scope from AEA. Under NEPA the re-
sponsibilities are broad and general and are directed to all federal agen-
cies.37 Congress more narrowly defined both the purpose of AEA and the
specific agency responsible for its implementation. 38  Consequently, rela-
tively little dispute has arisen over the legislative intent of the AEA, while
33. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(3) (1976).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See supra notes 6-7 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of an EIS.
35. Agencies must consider "presently unquantified environmental amenities and val-
ues" as well as "economic and technical considerations." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (1976).
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-4347 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The CEQ is a watchdog agency
with no regulatory authority. See S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1969); H.R. REP.
No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969). It functions as a research, resource and advisory
body to NEPA. Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972). The CEQ Guidelines reinforce the broad scope of
NEPA and lend support to a liberal interpretation of impacts cognizable under NEPA. For
example, the guidelines suggest that an EIS should accompany any proposed actions where
the environmental impact is likely to be controversial. Guidelines § 5(b), 36 Fed. Reg. 7724
(1971). The CEQ regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 1500 (1981), establish a uniform procedure for
implementing NEPA designed to eliminate inconsistent agency interpretations. 43 Fed.
Reg. 55,978 (1978). These regulations were issued pursuant to Exec. Order 11991 (1977), 3
C.F.R. § 124 (1978) and have been given "substantial deference" as an interpretation of
NEPA. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979). The PANE majority considers
these regulations binding. PANE, 678 F.2d at 231.
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976 & Supp. 1980). See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b) (1976) provid-
ing that:
In the performance of its functions the Commission is authorized to-
(b) establish by rule, regulation, or order, such standards and instructions to gov-
ern the possession and use ofspecial nuclear material, source material, and byproduct
material, as the Commission may deem necessary or desirable to promote the com-
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NEPA's "opaque" and "woefully ambiguous"3 9 language has contributed
to differing judicial interpretations of its scope.' Efforts of the courts to
define the impacts Congress intended NEPA to encompass have produced
no definitive test, and agencies have been left to derive their own standards
from a wealth of disparate judicial opinions. Until PANE, however, no
court had ruled on the cognizability of psychological effects.
II. PRIOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF NEPA
A. Injury to Health and Natural Resources Distinguished from
Secondary Sociological and Economic Impacts
In Maryland-National Capitol Park & Planning Commission v. United
States Postal Service,4 the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit laid the foundation for distinctions between the types
of harms cognizable under NEPA. The Commission brought suit to enjoin
further construction of a bulk mail center on the grounds that the Postal
Service failed to file an EIS. Before remanding the case, the court dis-
cussed several potential impacts including: inadequate protection from
storm-water and oil run-offs damaging river ecology and creating health
hazards; economic repercussions resulting from the influx of low income
workers; visual and esthetic detriment caused by building parking and
loading facilities adjacent to the highway; and increased traffic and pollu-
tion created by the complex's location.42 Judge Leventhal, writing for the
majority, noted that "genuine issues as to health"43 and impacts having an
affect on the "quality of the human environment"' trigger preparation of
an EIS, while fears of a social or economic nature do not.45 Congress
never intended NEPA to incorporate social opinion, economic concerns or
other equally diverse matters of individual taste.46
39. City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
(Friendly, CJ.); see also Voight, The National Enironmental Policy Act and the Independent
Regulatory Agency, 5 NATURAL RESOURCES LAW. 13 (1972).
40. See, e.g., Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Bergland, 428 F. Supp. 908 (D. Or.
1977) (a broad interpretation of the scope and contents of an EIS). But see First Nat'l Bank
v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369, 1377 (7th Cir. 1973) (construing the requirements of an EIS
more narrowly).
41. 487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
42. Id at 1033.
43. Id at 1039-40.
44. Id at 1038. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(2) (1976).
45. Maryland-Nat'l, 487 F.2d at 1037. See Groton v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 344 (D. Conn.
1972).
46. Using esthetics as an example, the court explained that, although NEPA requires
consideration of esthetics generally, (42 U.S.C. § 433 l(b)(2) (1976)), every decision has some
esthetic element involved, but not every decision falls within the purview of NEPA. Only
19831
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Five years later, in Image of Greater San Antonio v. Brown,47 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reiterated the socioeconomic
distinction made in Maryland-National and its progeny.48 The plaintiffs
challenged an Air Force decision to eliminate jobs at a San Antonio air
base arguing that the Air Force should prepare an EIS evaluating the so-
cioeconomic effects of its decision on the surrounding community. The
court held that only federal actions having a direct impact on "natural"
environmental resources 49 could trigger preparation of an EIS. It listed
technological advances, industrial expansion, resource exploitation, and
urban development as the types of activities which NEPA contemplated as
affecting the natural environment.5" Once an EIS has been triggered by a
primary impact, the court found that secondary socioeconomic impacts
may also be considered.5 Purely economic decisions with potential psy-
chological and sociological impacts fall within that category.
Other courts, although focusing on the distinction between primary and
secondary impacts, emphasized the effect of the action on the surrounding
community rather than the nature of the action. In Coma-Falcon Commu-
nity Coalition, Inc. v. United States Department of Labor, 2 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that the Department
of Labor's establishment of a Job Corps center on an existing site had no
primary impact on the human environment, 53 and thus an EIS was not
required. Allegations of vehicular and pedestrian congestion, impacts on
local utilities, commerce and social services, contributions to criminal ac-
tivity, and alteration of the character of the neighborhood resulting from
psychological or esthetic factors having a direct impact on the human environment will be
cognizable. 487 F.2d at 1038. See also National Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458
F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
47. 570 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1978).
48. Breckinridge v. Rumsfeld, 537 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1976), cer. denied, 429 U.S. 1061
(1977); Metlakatla Indian Community v. Adams, 427 F. Supp. 871 (D.D.C. 1977); National
Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Rumsfeld, 418 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Pa. 1976); National Ass'n of
Gov't Employees v. Rumsfeld, 413 F. Supp. 1224 (D.D.C. 1976), af'd sub nom. National
Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Brown, 556 F.2d 76 (DC. Cir. 1977).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
50. Brown, 570 F.2d at 522.
5 I. Id See Hanly I, 460 F.2d at 640; Council on Environmental Quality Guidelines, 40
C.F.R. § 1500.8(a)(3)(ii) (1975). But see McDonald v. Schlesinger, 404 F. Supp. 221 (W.D.
Mo. 1975). Primary impacts are those which directly affect the "human environment." See
infra note 53. Secondary impacts refer to indirect effects such as socioeconomic
ramifications.
52. 609 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980).
53. The CEQ regulations define human environment as "the natural and physical envi-
ronment and the relationship of people with that environment." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.04 (1981).
(Vol. 32:495
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an influx of low income participants were insufficient to trigger an EIS.5 4
The court dismissed all of these impacts as socioeconomic complaints not
cognizable under NEPA unless accompanied by a primary impact.55
In Monarch Chemical Works, Inc. v. Exon,56 the United States District
Court for the District of Nebraska expressly included psychological effects
in the category of secondary socioeconomic effects not cognizable under
NEPA. Rejecting an expansive interpretation of NEPA, the Monarch
court refused to evaluate potential psychological and sociological impacts
of a prison on the surrounding community. 7 The court emphasized that
these impacts are indirect and implied that a decision recognizing them
would encourage "creative litigation." The court also reasoned that the
environmental protection to be gained by preparation of an EIS based on
these factors would be proportionately much less than the time consumed
in its preparation.5"
B. Quant'Fabilty Raised As a Bar to Cognizability
As plaintiffs began challenging federal actions that would allegedly
harm psychological health, some courts, like the Monarch Court, merely
broadened the category of secondary'impacts to include psychological ef-
fects. Other courts, however, employed alternate analyses designed to dis-
miss psychological stress from consideration altogether.
The psychological and sociological effects of a proposed jail near resi-
dential dwellings were issues raised in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit seven years prior to the Monarch decision. In Hanly
v. Kleindienst,59 the court found that citizens' psychological distaste over
having a jail nearby could not be considered under NEPA. Unlike Mon-
arch's secondary impact analysis, however, the court based its decision on
the theory that these types of factors do not lend themselves to measure-
ment.' Elaborating on this distinction, the court noted that while crime or
noise levels can be quantified, psychological factors have no concrete
54. Como-Falcon, 609 F.2d at 345-46 (citing Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v.
Lynn, 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976)).
55. Como-Falcon, 609 F.2d at 345 (citing Image of Greater San Antonio v. Brown, 570
F.2d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 1978)).
56. 466 F. Supp. 639, 643 (D. Neb. 1979).
57. Id at 658.
58. Id
59. Hanly 11, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). Hanly 1I
involved a NEPA study of the proposed construction of a jail as part of the Court House
Annex being built in the Foley Square neighborhood. The case was remanded twice by the
court of appeals. See Hanly I, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972).
60. Hanly 1I, 471 F.2d at 833.
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means of appraisal. 61 The majority opinion stressed the importance of be-
ing able to determine "absolute quantitative adverse environmental ef-
fects" as one of the factors relevant to the agency's threshold review of any
proposed action.62
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Friendly relied on the language of NEPA,
the purpose of an EIS, and the CEQ guidelines to conclude that psycho-
logical stress should be cognizable. NEPA directs that "presently unquan-
tified environmental amenities and values . . . be given appropriate
consideration in decision making along with economic and technical con-
siderations., 63 According to Judge Friendly, an EIS must include all rele-
vant data if it is to fulfill its purpose of ensuring that agencies will make
informed decisions before committing federal resources. 6 Finally, he di-
rected attention to the broad CEQ interpretation of NEPA's duties.65 The
court rejected Judge Friendly's opinion, not on the merits of his argument,
but because it found practical problems with implementing such a vague
standard.66
The Second Circuit's concern, expressed in Hanly II, over the inability
to quantify psychological and sociological harm apparently was not shared
by the Seventh Circuit in deciding Chelsea Neighborhood Association v.
United States Postal Service.67 Under Chelsea, agencies must consider
both physical and social science data when making NEPA decisions.68
Using that data, the court found that emotional and physical isolation of
people in high rise apartments must be considered in an EIS. The court
61. Unlike noise which can be measured in decibels and even crime levels which can be
calculated through the use of crime statistics, psychological factors are not readily quanti-
fied. Id at 833 n.10.
62. Id at 836.
63. Id at 839 (Friendly, J., dissenting) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (1970)).
64. Hanly 11, 471 F.2d at 837-38.
65. Id The CEQ recommends providing an EIS in all controversial decisions. See
supra note 36 and accompanying text.
66. The majority attempted to impose an objective standard to determine when an EIS
would be required. The relevant factors to be considered by an agency making a threshold
determination were:
(1) the extent to which the action will cause adverse environmental effects in excess
of those created by existing uses in the area affected by it, and (2) the absolute
quantitative adverse environmental effects of the action itself, including the cumu-
lative harm that results from its contribution to existing adverse conditions or uses
in the affected area.
Hanly II, 471 F.2d at 830-3 1.
67. 516 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1973) (implicitly adopting Judge Friendly's dissent from
Hanly II, 471 F.2d at 836).
68. Chelsea NeighborhoodAssln, 516 F.2d at 388. See also 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(a) (1976
& Supp. III 1979); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.6, 1507.2 (1981); S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
8 (1969).
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never considered whether such factors were quantifiable; it simply asserted
that they must be evaluated. Chelsea, however, appears to be an anomaly
implicitly rejected by later NEPA decisions in other circuits.69
In an attempt to escape the problems of quantification, the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits held that mathematical precision may not be necessary
under NEPA. In Robinson v. Knebel,7 ° the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit recognized that environmental factors are frequently
not amenable to quantification. Land owners challenged the condemna-
tion of their property for inclusion in a recreational development. The
court found that the plaintiffs received a fair cost-benefit analysis without
assigning precise dollar values to every environmental consideration. The
court suggested that, if the EIS "otherwise recognizes, discusses, and
weighs the favorable and adverse effects of agency action,"'" absolute
quantification may not be necessary. In Trout Unlimited v. Morton,72 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in refusing to enjoin
construction of a dam, also found a formal, mathematical cost-benefit
analysis unnecessary. The court recognized the need to weigh the advan-
tages and disadvantages of every proposal and to compare the results with
a similar analysis of alternatives. It found that broad inclusion of informa-
tion is crucial in making informed decisions, serves to educate the public
on the proposed project, and "encourages public participation in the devel-
opment of that information."73 Accordingly, information, whether suscep-
tible to mathematical representation or not, must be included in an EIS.74
C. Subjective v. Objective Impacts
The post-Hanly decisions significantly weaken arguments which attempt
to reject consideration of impacts based on lack of quantifiability. Still
searching for valid objections to the inclusion of psychological stress
69. See, e.g., Como-Falcon Community Coalition, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor,
609 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980); Monarch Chem. Works, Inc.
v. Exon, 466 F. Supp. 639, 658 (D. Neb. 1979); Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney,
387 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd in part on other grounds, 523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1975).
70. 550 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1977).
71. Id at 426.
72. 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974).
73. Id at 1283. See also Jones v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency,
499 F.2d 502, 521 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975).
74. In accordance with the court's logic, see 40 C.F.R. § 1500.8(a)(4)(1976). "In each
case, the analysis should be sufficiently detailed to reveal the agency's comparative evalua-
tion of the environmental benefits, costs and risks of the proposed action and each reason-
able alternative." See generally Comment, Judicial Review of Cost-Benefit Analysis under
NEP4, 53 NEB. L. REV. 540 (1974); Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Courts. Judicial Re-
view under NEP4, 9 GA. L. REV. 417 (1975).
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within NEPA, courts began to question whether such factors were too sub-
jective to permit meaningful analysis. In First National Bank v. Richard-
son," the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied
an objective fact approach, dismissing both the quantifiability and secon-
dary socioeconomic arguments as problematic. The court held that the
General Services Administration (GSA) had sufficiently evaluated the po-
tential impacts of building a parking garage and detention center in an
inner city area. When making its study, the GSA considered information
on construction, conformity to building codes, adequacy and availability
of utilities and waste disposal facilities, increased traffic, security precau-
tions, and feasibility of alternative sites. Noting that inner city environ-
mental impacts often interact with socioeconomic conditions, the court
indicated that attempts to separate and label problems would be futile.76
Instead, it suggested broadening the traditional definition of environmen-
tal impacts to include concerns unique to inner city life.
The First National Bank court relegated discussion of psychological im-
pacts to a footnote and disposed of the issue summarily. Citing Hanly 11"7
for the proposition that "public sensibilities" to the building of prisons in
residential areas "do not lend themselves to measurement," the court de-
termined that, even if amenable to quanitification, such sensibilities are
not properly cognizable under NEPA.7" To be cognizable, an allegation
must present clear and convincing evidence of danger to public safety.79
Fear of harm alone is insufficient; the safety of the community must in fact
be in jeopardy.
Two years later, the Seventh Circuit again emphasized the need for ob-
jective facts rather than mere subjective fears of potential harm before an
impact becomes cognizable under NEPA. In Nucleus of Chicago Home-
owners Association v. Lynn, 0 the court refused to enjoin the building of
low income housing until the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development could prepare an EIS to take into account neighbor-
hood fears of the prospective tenants. Quoting Maryland-National for the
75. 484 F.2d 1369 (7th Cir. 1973).
76. Id at 1377 (quoting 2 CoUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUAL. ANN. REP. 1189-91 (Aug. 1971)).
"Life in the inner city embraces a range of environmental problems, some starkly evident,
some disguised, some acknowledged as environmental, some wearing other labels. . . . [In
the inner city] many of our most severe environmental problems interact with social and
economic conditions which the Nation is also seeking to improve."
77. 471 F.2d at 833.
78. First Na1'/ Bank of Chicago, 484 F.2d at 1380 n.13 (quoting Hanly 11, 471 F.2d at
833).
79. 484 F.2d at 1380 n.13.
80. 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976).
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proposition that "concerned persons might fashion a claim supported by
linguistics and etymology,"'" the Seventh Circuit stressed the need for tan-
gible evidence of potential harm.
The Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney s2 court followed the logic
of First National Bank and Chicago Homeowners to support its refusal to
enjoin construction of low income housing. The majority clarified its rea-
soning by dividing its discussion into two separate issues. First, it con-
cluded, NEPA does require consideration of those tangible factors such as
the incidence of crime and the quality of schools which are the basis for
social attitudes of residents.83 Relying on Hanly I,4 the court found that
NEPA clearly mandates analysis of "physical, social, cultural and aesthetic
dimensions."8 5 Second, the court discussed whether the social attitudes
themselves must be weighed independently of the tangible factors upon
which they may be based. 6 It determined that attitudes and fears unsup-
ported by tangible facts are not cognizable under NEPA because NEPA
requires a factual study. 7 The plaintiffs in Trinity Episcopal failed to show
convincing evidence to support their fears. Consequently, the court denied
their request to enjoin changes in an urban renewal plan.
D. Potential Health Hazards
Two recent district court decisions dealing specifically with potential
health hazards clearly separated impacts on human health from impacts
on the environment. All previous distinctions had been developed primar-
81. Id at 231 (quoting Maryland-Nat?, 487 F.2d at 1037).
82. 387 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd in part on other grounds, 523 F.2d 88 (2d
Cir. 1975).
83. "Thus issues such as percentage of minority residents or proximity of public hous-
ing projects and the quality of community services such as the degree of crime, police protec-
tion, schools, hospitals, fire protection, recreation, transportation and commercial
establishments are essential to a NEPA study." Trinity Episcopal, 387 F. Supp. at 1078.
84. Hanly 1, 460 F.2d at 647:
The National Environmental Policy Act contains no exhaustive list of so-called
Ienvironmental considerations,' but without question its aims extend beyond sew-
age and garbage and even beyond water and air pollution. The Act must be con-
strued to include protection of the quality of life for city residents. Noise, traffic,
overburdened mass transportation systems, crime, congestion and even availability
of drugs all affect the urban 'environment' and are surely results of the 'profound
influences of. . . high-density urbanization [and] industrial expansion.'
(citations omitted).
85. Trinity Episcopal, 387 F. Supp. at 1078.
86. Id at 1078-79.
87. Id. at 1075. "[Clommunity attitudes and fears, or the propensity of certain eco-
nomic or racial groups to commit anti-social behavior, do not lend themselves to... objec-
tive analysis . I..." d at 1078-79.
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ily to narrow the parameters of NEPA, while these two decisions expanded
them. Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Bergland 8 held that an EIS
prepared by the United States Forest Service on its Vegetation Manage-
ment Program inadequately discussed the effects of herbicide contami-
nants on human and animal health. 9 The court issued an injunction to
prevent the use of phenoxy herbicides by the U.S. Forest Service pending a
more complete study. It stated that "no subject to be covered by an EIS
can be more important than the potential effect of a federal program upon
the health of human beings."9 0 While the court did not require considera-
tion of "remote and highly speculative consequences," it did indicate that
any uncertain or unknown effects and any disagreement by experts on pos-
sible adverse consequences must be noted.9 The broad scope of analysis
mandated by the Bergland decision may apply only to cases involving
health hazards. The court indicated that the nature of a proposal deter-
mines the level of study necessary.92 The majority opinion focused on the
potential health hazard presented and extended the scope and content of
an EIS beyond that required in any previous case.
In National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. United
States Department of State,9 the court required the State Department to
consider the effects of the United States' participation in an aerial narcotics
eradication program in Mexico. In a brief opinion, Judge Waddy empha-
sized that the health aspect of this case was determinative. Where a poten-
tial health hazard exists, an EIS is mandated.94 In addition to the need to
evaluate closely any adverse consequences and weigh these impacts
against possible advantages, the court found a responsibility under NEPA
to educate the public.9 5 The existence of health hazards mandates an ex-
pansive view of NEPA.
The line of cases prior to PANE created various distinctions designed to
limit the scope of NEPA. Secondary sociological and economic impacts
were distinguished from primary impacts,96 attempts were made to catego-
88. 428 F. Supp. 908 (D. Or. 1977).
89. id at 927.
90. Id at 908-09.
91. Id at 922.
92. Id at 934. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79,
93 (2d Cir. 1975).
93. 452 F. Supp. 1226 (D.D.C. 1978).
94. Id at 1232.
95. See id at 1234; see also Jones v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency,
499 F.2d 502, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975).
96. See supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text.
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rize impacts as objective or subjective, 97 and certain effects were elimi-
nated from consideration for lack of quantifiability. 9' Finally, recognizing
the serious implications of allowing uncertainty where potential effects on
health exist, courts began to distinguish impacts on health from impacts on
the environment. This latter distinction, adopted by the PANE Court, be-
came the basis for broadening the scope of NEPA to encompass potential
psychological harm.
III. PEOPLE AGAINST NUCLFAR ENERGY V UNITED STATES NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION: PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS ARE
COGNIZABLE UNDER NEPA
Following a serious accident at TMI-2, the NRC decided to delay restart
of TMI- 1 until it reviewed the safety of the reactor. It issued an order and
notice of hearing regarding the restart of TMI-1. 9 The notice listed the
issues to be considered; psychological stress was not among them. The
NRC also announced the formation of a Licensing Board, charged with
conducting public hearings and defining issues appropriate for considera-
tion in the restart process. Those wishing to raise the issue of psychologi-
cal stress were invited to submit briefs to the Licensing Board."° PANE
filed two contentions and a supporting brief contending that psychological
stress ought to be considered in the NRC's decision. The Licensing Board
recommended consideration of psychological stress,'' but the NRC re-
jected PANE's position and the Licensing Board's recommendation and
excluded from its appraisal of TMI-1 alleged psychological stress.' 0 2 On
petition to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia, the court held that psychological stress is cognizable under NEPA.° 3
Judge Wright, in the majority opinion, relied primarily on the legislative
intent and the plain language of NEPA °4 He noted that the issue was
97. See supra notes 75-87 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 59-74 and accompanying text.
99. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), 10
N.R.C. 141 (1979). See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
100. Metropolitan Edison Co., 10 N.R.C. at 140.
101. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), 11
N.R.C. 297 (1980).
102. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), 12
N.R.C. 607 (1980). On Dec. 5, 1980, four of the five commissioners voted on that recom-
mendation. The vote was split (2-2); consequently, the restart hearing continued without
consideration of psychological stress.
103. The court issued an amended judgment on April 2, 1982, vacating an injunction
issued in an interim judgment issued Jan. 7, 1982. PANE v. NRC, 678 F.2d 222, 226 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
104. Id at 228 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 433 1(b), 433 1(c) (1976)).
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one of first impression and attempted to limit the impact of the decision by
shaping the holding directly to the unique situation the case presents. Un-
til TMI, this country had never experienced a major accident at a nuclear
power plant.'05 Judge Wright also distinguished this case from cases
where courts found secondary socioeconomic impacts not cognizable
under NEPA. He perceived direct harm to human health, not just secon-
dary impacts on the environment. 1°6 The PANE majority cited several
cases for the proposition that an EIS must be prepared where a potential
effect on human health exists. 107 Regarding quantifiability, the court dis-
missed concerns over the NRC's ability to accurately measure psychologi-
cal effects. If the esthetic value of trees in a national park can be
considered for the purpose of an EIS,'0 psychological harm can also be
considered. The NRC licensing board also found that, at least for the pur-
poses of NEPA, "psychological stress is sufficiently quantifiable."'" Con-
cluding that people in the area around Three Mile Island, as well as the
nation as a whole, have a right to participate where a decision could affect
their psychological health, the court remanded the case to the NRC for
further study. If the NRC finds new information or new circumstances
pertaining to effects of TMI on psychological health, a supplemental EIS
must be prepared."10
Judge Wilkey's dissent distinguished the cases relied on by the majority,
pointing out that in these cases the federal action itself caused the impact
on health."' The cases do not consider any instance where fear of the
federal action causes an impact on health. Judge Wilkey criticized the
court's decision because it will require the NRC to assess not only the risk
of a proposed activity, but also "how people perceive and react to that
risk."" 2 If the NRC finds that the actual proposed activity creates no sig-
nificant risk of health hazards, it must still deny the proposal because the
105. PANE, 678 F.2d at 228.
106. Id at 229.
107. Id See, e.g., Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. United States
Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1039-40 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (allegations that inadequate water run-
off system will endanger health by causing floods; agency must consider "genuine issues as
to health" before deciding whether to prepare an environmental impact statement); Citizens
Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Bergland, 428 F. Supp. 908, 927 (D. Or. 1977) (no subject to be
covered by an EIS can be more important than the potential effects of a federal program
upon the health of human beings).
108. PANE, 678 F.2d at 230 n.10.
109. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), I1
N.R.C. at 301.
110. PANE, 678 F.2d at 235.
1!1. Id at 238 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
112. Id at 239.
[Vol. 32:495
Psychological Harm Under NEPA
public perceives and fears a risk to health. Attacking the court's dismissal
of the quantifiability problem, Judge Wilkey characterized potential psy-
chological harm as ephemeral and speculative." 3 He rejected the court's
distinction between fears of secondary sociological impacts ("mere anxie-
ties") and "medically-recognized impairment of the psychological
health."" 4 The court's decision could ultimately allow any allegation of
psychological stress to postpone implementation of a proposed action. Ex-
tending NEPA to this extreme, Judge Wilkey argued, would frustrate na-
tional policy by delaying the development of nuclear power.'
IV. ANALYSIS OF PANE's IMPACTS AND IMPLICATIONS
The PANE decision presents a potential for significant expansion of the
scope of NEPA as it was previously interpreted by courts. By tying the
issue of public fears directly to health hazards instead of social and eco-
nomic concerns, a court for the first time found a category of fear cogniza-
ble under NEPA. While the PANE majority attempts to limit the
applicability of its holding, the dissent recognizes that this decision could
have a significant impact on future cases. Inclusion of psychological harm
caused by fear of a federal action within the definition of health may ex-
tend NEPA to the point where it becomes limitless and cannot fulfill its
goals.
A. Fulfillng NEPA "s Goals: The Purpose of an EIS
In promulgating NEPA, Congress recognized that man and his environ-
ment are inexorably linked." 6 Any action taken that will have an impact
on the environment will inevitably affect mankind. Likewise, the converse
is true. In order to protect both natural resources and human productivity,
Congress established a procedure to ensure that agencies would be ap-
prised of all potential impacts on health and the environment that an ac-
113. Id. at 240.
114. Id at 242-43.
115. Id at 237-38.
116. Congress expressed a desire to "attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the
environment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unin-
tended consequences," 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(3) (1976) and insure that "man and nature can
exist in productive harmony." 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1976). One might compare the language
of NEPA with the language chosen by the framers of the United States Constitution. The
Constitution was written with an eye to the future. Just as the framers could not predict the
potential changes that could occur in future generations, Congress could not outline the
developments it expected NEPA to protect. Instead, it established sound policy in a manner
flexible enough to adapt and encompass a myriad of potential future developments.
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tion might have before making a final decision on that action. 17 Health
and potential risks to health are clearly cognizable."' While no court has
held that psychological harm is not a legitimate health hazard, several
courts have held that mere fear of a potential health hazard is not cogniza-
ble under NEPA." 9 The PANE majority admitted that fear does not nec-
essarily have a direct impact on health. All previous cases that declined to
consider the fear of residents can be distinguished from the PANE case
because they dealt with purely socioeconomic impacts on the community.
Since the courts have never recognized secondary socioeconomic impacts
as being within the direct intent of NEPA, these impacts alone are not
significant enough to trigger the preparation of an EIS. 20 When fear of a
federal action reaches the level where it directly affects the health of the
community, a new issue arises. Health, unlike socioeconomic impacts, is a
direct impact cognizable under NEPA.' 2 '
Judge Wilkey expressed concern that an over-inclusive analysis would
defeat the usefulness of the statute and take NEPA far beyond its intended
purpose.' 22 The delay caused by the preparation of an EIS, especially
where the EIS requires the agency to gain expertise outside its own field,
may have a greater impact on society than the information obtained in the
EIS. 23 He also feared that the majority decision would permit any allega-
tion of psychological harm to delay the implementation of a critical federal
117. After a threshold determination is made by the agency involved that the pending
action could significantly affect health or the environment, an EIS must be prepared. See 42
U.S.C. § 4332 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See supra notes 6-7, 32-36 and accompanying text.
118. NEPA asserts that the federal government must, among other things, assure that its
actions do not cause "risk to health or safety." 42 U.S.C. § 433 1(b)(3) (1976 & Supp. III
1979). See National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. United States Dep't of State,
452 F. Supp. 1226 (D.D.C. 1978); Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Bergland, 428 F.
Supp. 908 (D. Or. 1977).
119. Como-Falcon Community Coalition, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 609 F.2d
342 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980); Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n
v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976); Maryland-Nat'l
Capital Park and Planning Comm'n v. United States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir.
1973); First Nat'l Bank v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369 (7th Cir. 1973).
120. PANE, 678 F.2d 222, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Although socioeconomic impacts can-
not trigger an EIS, they must be included as cognizable impacts when a direct impact does
trigger an EIS. See Como-Falcon Community Coalition, Inc. v. United States Dep't of
Labor, 609 F.2d 342, 345-46 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980); Image of
Greater San Antonio v. Brown, 570 F.2d 517, 522-23 (5th Cir. 1978).
121. See supra note 118.
122. PANE, 678 F.2d 222, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
123. Monarch Chem. Works, Inc. v. Exon, 466 F. Supp. 639, 640 (D. Neb. 1979). But see
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("consideration of Administrative difficulties, delay, or
economic cost does not not strip the provision of its fundamental importance").
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program.' 24 While Judge Wilkey did not support uninformed decision-
making, he did question the prudence of requiring the NRC to assess "how
people perceive and react"' 25 to the risk of a proposed action.
126
The majority maintained that its decision would promote the informa-
tional intent of the Act rather than defeat its usefulness. 127 If, in fact, the
fears of the public are irrational, the preparation of an EIS could serve an
important role in educating the public as well as the agency.' 28 Any un-
precedented proposal arouses skepticism. 29  In highly technical areas
where the general public has a very limited knowledge, the fear of the
unknown creates a tendency to avoid the perceived risks of a new project
124. Using Congress's decision to promote and support the advancement of nuclear en-
ergy and citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 557-58 (1978), as an example, Wilkey explained his concern. Where
Congress, or a duly empowered agency implementing a policy decision of Congress, makes a
decision to proceed with a given program which it deems to be in the best interest of society,
the uninformed and changing fancies or fear of public opinion should not override that
decision. PANE, 678 F.2d 222, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
125. PANE, 678 F.2d at 239 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
126. Judge Wilkey's opinion reflects a theory postulated by the founding fathers and
reflected in the structure of our democratic system of government. See THE FEDERALIST
No. 10 (J. Madison). While public opinion and individual input into the governmental
decisionmaking process is critical, the passions of the masses are easily swayed. Strong fed-
eral policy cannot be based on the changing whims of public opinion. Congress, set up as
the representative body of government, theoretically collects public opinion, filters it and
uses it to generate stable policy. It also prevents a vocal minority from overriding the best
interests of the majority. Unlike Congress, a governmental body attempting to implement a
federal policy is not making a political decision. Rather, it is taking a decision and attempt-
ing to implement it in the most effective, least offensive manner possible. A congressional
decision to support and promote nuclear energy would not be defeated by a decision not to
reopen TMI-I. The NRC would simply be forced to pursue an alternate course of action.
127. N EPA's informational purpose is not limited to just the agency involved in the deci-
sion. Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. United States Postal Serv., 487
F.2d 1029, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d
827 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Bergland, 428 F. Supp. 908, 922
(D. Or. 1977).
128. See Workshop on Psychological Stress Associated with the Proposed Restart of Three
Mile Island, Unit 1 [hereinafter cited as Workshop] (Proceedings prepared by the Mitre
Corp., sponsored by the NRC, and held in February 1982 in McLean, VA. The workshop
found that educating the public and providing access to information may ameliorate much
potential psychological stress); see also Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1283 (9th
Cir. 1974); Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park and Planning Comm'n, 487 F.2d at 1041; Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109,
1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Burkey v. Ellis, 483 F. Supp. 897 (N.D. Ala. 1979); Citizens Against
Toxic Sprays, Inc., 428 F. Supp. at 922.
129. Workshop, supra note 128, at 12 (sophisticated technology which the general public
does not comprehend can translate into fear. The unknown extent of long term effects and
the frequent disagreement of experts over the safety of nuclear power create confusion and
fear as well.)
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even .if that means accepting the limitations of an old alternative.
30
Through the preparation of an EIS, the agency has the opportunity to per-
suade the public of the necessity, value, and safety of the proposed activity.
Education could reduce the chance that views which are "scientifically ig-
norant and divorced from reality" will thwart the advancement of a sound
federal activity.' 3 '
Preparation of an EIS may produce another benefit as well. Monarch
Chemical expressed concern that consideration of fears will place courts
and agencies in a position of judging the legitimacy and rationality of a
particular fear.'3 2 An EIS, in essence, is a cost-benefit analysis. The bene-
fits of the proposed action must outweigh the potential adverse conse-
quences the action might have on health and the environment. 3 3 Fear
and psychological stress will be evaluated with all the other impacts both
beneficial and adverse. When considered in the context of the entire eval-
uation, the legitimacy and rationality of the fear should be more apparent.
Because the EIS examines all the impacts of the proposal, no single factor
will be outcome determinative. Psychological stress caused by neighbor-
hood fears will not alone defeat a meritorious proposal.
B. Psychological Impacts Amenable to Analysis
The most frequently mentioned problems that courts find with consider-
ing psychological stress is determining when that stress rises to the level of
cognizable impact and how that impact can be quantified for analysis. In
PANE, the majority's holding is very narrow, reflecting the court's under-
standing of the need to distinguish mere fears from actual psychological
impacts. According to the court's decision in PANE, NEPA applies to
130. PANE, 678 F.2d 222, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citing separate studies by the Hershey
Medical Center, the Pennsylvania Department of Health, the Western Psychiatric Institute
of the University of Pittsburgh, and Central Pennsylvania Blue Shield).
131. PANE, 678 F.2d at 226.
132. Monarch Chem. Works, Inc., 466 F. Supp. at 655. See Workshop, supra note 128, at
15 (distinguishing between irrational (subjective, not data-based) and rational (objective,
data-based) fears is often difficult and not necessarily helpful).
133. Jones v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502, 512
(D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975). Essentially, the EIS must balance the
benefits and environmental costs of the proposed action and each reasonable alternative and
then determine which course of action has the best net balance. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976
& Supp. III 1979); 40 C.F.R. § 1500.8(a)(4) (1976). See also Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1972); National Org. for Reform of
Marijuana Laws v. United States, 452 F. Supp. 1226, 1234 (D.D.C. 1978); Citizens Against
Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Bergland, 428 F. Supp. 908, 934 (D. Or. 1977); Trinity Episcopal
School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044, 1075 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1975).
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"post-traumatic anxieties, accompanied by physical effects and caused by
fear of recurring catastrophe."'' 34 This holding leaves open for decision in
future cases whether or not both physical effects and prior traumatic catas-
trophes are necessary to lend validity to allegations of psychological
stress.' 35 The dissent argues that the majority's decision opens the flood-
gates for a panoply of creative suits alleging harm to psychological well-
being.' 36 In support of its criticism, it cites four recent licensing and per-
mit proceedings which have already raised psychological stress claims.'
37
The court's requirement that a physical impact on health be shown can
be traced to several prior decisions. The Seventh Circuit, in First National
Bank, expressed its opinion that fear of harm alone would be insufficient
to trigger an EIS. 13 1 Without clear and convincing evidence of actual psy-
chological harm caused by that fear, no tangible impact exists. "Public
sensibilities" like esthetic tastes are subjective factors unless they become
manifest in physical effects. As the court in Maryland-National noted, es-
thetics play a role in every proposed action; however, unless the deci-
sionmaker has some objective criteria by which to analyze the esthetic
values involved, they are not cognizable under NEPA. 39 Likewise, fears,
public sensibilities, and psychological factors are present in every situa-
tion. They too cannot be recognized as impacts until they are amenable to
objective analysis.
The critical dilemma lies in deciding what clear and convincing evi-
dence transforms a claim of psychological stress from something subjective
into something objective and cognizable under NEPA. "Linguistics and
etymology" will not support a claim of psychological stress." Trinity
Episcopal suggests, with regard to impacts on the environment, that the
effects must be physical. 4 ' If we extend that requirement to impacts on
134. PANE, 678 F.2d 222, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
135. Id at 248 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
136. These suits would not be limited to NEPA but would apply to actions of all agen-
cies. Id at 239 n.17.
137. See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., NRC No. 50-358 (previously rejected contention
raised again Mar. 4, 1982); Carolina Power and Light Co., NRC Nos. 50-400, 50-401 (con-
tentions raised Feb. 17, 1982); Public Serv. Co. of Okla., NRC Nos. 50-556, 50-557 (conten-
tion raised Feb. 1, 1982); Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. & Power Auth. of N.Y., NRC
Nos. 50-247-SP, 50-286-SP (contention raised Dec. 8, 1981).
138. First Nat'l Bank v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369, 1380 n.13 (7th Cir. 1973).
139. Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. United States Postal Serv., 487
F.2d 1029, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
140. Id at 1037.
141. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044, 1078-79 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), rev'd in part on other grounds, 523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Nucleus of Chi-
cago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225, 231 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
967 (1976).
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hpalth, the relevant consideration appears to be whether the proposed act
or action will have a physical effect on health. While psychological dis-
taste alone will not be considered, 42 when psychological response rises to
the level of actual physical harm, it becomes cognizable.
As the dissent in PANE pointed out, the actual outward manifestations
of psychological harm are often minor if they appear at all.'43 PANE es-
tablishes no test to determine, outside of obvious external conditions, when
psychological health has been physically disturbed. Presumably, medical
experts can make a determination of psychological harm on a case by case
basis. The Chicago Homeowners court questioned social statistics as a
measure of human behavior.'" Medical and scientific studies have also
been criticized for their inability to agree on psychological harm diagnosis.
If no such determination can be reliably made, psychological stress may
never be factored into an EIS.
The inability to recognize physical effects without actual outward mani-
festations raises the problem of quantifiability. This question of whether a
physical effect can be accurately measured must be distinguished from the
question of whether alleged stress is objective rather than subjective. Once
psychological stress is recognized as having an objective impact, an accept-
able standard of measurement must still be found. 45 Theoretically, psy-
chological stress could be objective but still not amenable to analysis and,
therefore, not cognizable under NEPA. The prior decisions requiring a
physical effect to establish a tangible impact cognizable under NEPA dealt
with situations where the impact would be on the environment, not on
health. 46 Once again, health becomes the critical distinction. While envi-
ronmental impacts are clearly recognizable if they are direct and have
physical effects, impacts on health can be direct and physical but have no
outward manifestations. Depending upon the sensitivity of the individual,
he or she can have psychological mental harm resulting from fear of physi-
142. Hanly ll, 471 F.2d at 833.
143, 678 F.2d at 241 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). PANE claimed to have evidence of such
physical disorders as skin rashes, aggravated ulcers, and skeletal and muscular problems
resulting from the psychological stress of the TMI-2 accident. Brief for PANE, PANE v.
N.R.C., 678 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
144. Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976).
145. "Unlike factors such as noise, which can be related to decibels and units which
measure duration, or crime, in which crime statistics are available, psychological factors are
not readily translatable into concrete measuring rods." Hanly If, 471 F.2d at 833, n. 10.
146. See Image of Greater San Antonio v. Brown, 570 F.2d at 522; Nucleus of Chicago
Homeowners Ass'n, 524 F.2d at 231; First NatI Bank, 484 F.2d at 1371; Trinity Episcopal,
387 F. Supp. at 1075-83.
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cal safety without generating any outward symptoms of that harm. Such
effects, while objective, may not be measurable.
C Fallback Positions of the PANE Court
In an attempt to identify psychological impacts that are cognizable, the
PANE court resorts to a categorization of stress as "mere dissatisfaction"
or "severe anxieties."' 47 The dissent attacks the court's choice of language
claiming that severity should only be a factor once the impact is cogniza-
ble.'48 The criticism stems from semantics only. In effect, the court simply
reverts to the same socioeconomic classification made by previous
courts. 49 The real distinction the court made was whether the impact on
psychological health stems from a legitimate fear of one's personal safety
or from a fear of a secondary socioeconomic impact.' 50 The court's deci-
sion does, as Judge Wilkey notes, leave open a broad spectrum of potential
fears and anxieties which may be cognizable under NEPA.
To limit its holding further, the PANE majority adds another stipulation
on when psychological stress can be cognizable under NEPA. The anxie-
ties causing the stress not only must have physical manifestations, but also
must be the result of a prior traumatic event.' 5 ' This requirement is in-
tended to bolster the legitimacy of the fear because it has already become a
reality.' 52 The psychological stress resulting from the traumatic event
stems from a fear that the same event will recur. Any fear of a potential
accident that may have been present before TMI began operation was un-
substantiated. Now that one disaster has occurred, the PANE majority
finds the fear to be legitimate and amenable to analysis within an EIS.
Whether future decisions in other circuits will require a prior traumatic
147. "NEPA does not encompass mere dissatisfactions arising from social opinion, eco-
nomic concerns, or political agreements arising from social opinion, economic concerns, or
political disagreements with agency policies." PANE, 678 F.2d 222, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(citation omitted).
148. Id at 240-41 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
149. See Como-Falcon Community Coalition, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 609
F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980); Image of Greater San Antonio v.
Brown, 570 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1978); Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v.
United States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Monarch Chem. Works, Inc. v.
Exon, 466 F. Supp. 639 (D. Neb. 1979).
150. 678 F.2d 222, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The example used by the dissent of a person
living near a prison or high crime area suffering from a fear of physical harm illustrates that
Judge Wilkey overlooked the real distinction Judge Wright had made. Id at 241 (Wilkey,
J., dissenting).
151. Id at 230.
152. See Monarch ChetnL Works, Inc., 466 F. Supp. at 655. Monarch raised legitimacy in
regard to environmental effects. An agency is not required to evaluate "remote impacts
associated with an attenuated and speculative chain of events." Id
19831
Catholic University Law Review
event is uncertain. The requirement of a physical effect has a basis in prior
law, but no court has ever discussed prior traumatic events with regard to
NEPA. 53 The PANE court, however, needed to find a concrete basis of
analysis. Because fear, anxiety, and psychological stress are by nature sub-
jective, they present analytical problems. In making a threshold determi-
nation of whether a genuine issue of health exists, the agency
decisionmaker needs a "measuring rod."' 5 4 While the threshold where
health issues are concerned is "relatively low," agencies cannot make "ar-
bitrary and capricious" decisions.'55 A prior accident provides a basis for
both credibility of the claim of stress and comparative analysis of its im-
pact in an EIS.' 56
Present inability to measure psychological stress accurately should not
preclude it from consideration under NEPA. 1'57 Chief Judge Friendly
noted early in the NEPA debates that agencies should not be allowed to
make their decisions in doubtful cases without considering all relevant
data. 58 Allowing important decisions to be made without considering cer-
tain potential impacts because those impacts present problems of quantifi-
cation, contravenes the purpose of NEPA. Just as courts have found ways
to measure psychological impacts for determining damages in torts or
mental insanity in criminal cases, a suitable means of measuring psycho-
logical stress for evaluation under NEPA will emerge.'
5 9
153. Logically, it seems to be repugnant to the purpose of NEPA to hold that the actual
harm feared must be realized before the impact of that fear can be recognized. See 42
U.S.C. § 4331 (1976).
154. Hanly 11, 471 F.2d at 833 n. 10. The physical effects of psychological harm are often
inward only and do not manifest themselves in symptoms an untrained observer could
recognize.
155. Maryland-Nao'l, 487 F.2d at 1039-40. Several courts have adopted the position that
Congress, in passing NEPA, intended to give the agencies involved great discretion. Eg.,
Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 967 (1976); First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369, 1381 (7th
Cir. 1973). While judicial limitations have been imposed where courts have found abuse of
discretion, the court will generally defer to the good faith judgment of the agency. Id at
1377.
156. In establishing a basis for analysis of psychological stress relating to restart of TMI-
1, extrapolation from existing studies on TMI-2 has been suggested as one reliable tool for
measurement. Workshop, supra note 128, at xxi.
157. The federal government has a duty to "identify and develop methods and proce-
dures ... which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values
may be given appropriate consideration in decision-making ...." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B)
(1976). Inability to solve a problem does not mean that an EIS is unnecessary. Maryland-
Nat'l, 487 F.2d at 1041.
158. Han,/y 1, 471 F.2d at 837-38 (Friendly, C.J., dissenting).
159. Workshop results suggest several potential methods of evaluation including analo-
gies to other traumatic events, extrapolation from presently existing TMI studies and supple-
mental data for new studies. Workshop, supra note 128, at 12.
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V. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE NEPA DECISIONS
Though narrowly stated, the holding in PANE could have a broad im-
pact on the scope of NEPA depending on how future courts interpret it.
Judge Wilkey's dissent criticizes the court's holding as overly expansive.
He suggests that an EIS would be triggered by any allegation of psycholog-
ical stress."W In view of the majority's carefully worded holding and the
precedent set in other cases, such an extended reading appears unlikely.
1 6'
The secondary socioeconomic distinction still remains. While several
courts have discussed sociological and psychological well-being,162 no
court has ever suggested that social changes could have a primary impact
on health. Focusing on health as the key to the court's decision, other
courts in subsequent decisions can distinguish PANE from most fear-re-
lated allegations. If the post-traumatic requirement remains, the PANE
decision would have an extremely limited application. On the other hand,
if courts discard PANE's prerequisites and recognize psychological stress
prior to the occurrence of a traumatic event, PANE could lay the founda-
tion for a significant expansion of NEPA's scope.
The court's recognition of post-traumatic psychological health effects as
impacts cognizable under NEPA will, if only in this instance, alter the
scope of an EIS. Public input into the realm of federal decisionmaking
will increase and the additional input can serve to enhance rather than
impede the goals of NEPA. The threat of having a proposed action
delayed by preparation of an EIS considering alleged psychological stress
may prompt agencies into implementing public education programs. Con-
crete knowledge of the risks as well as the safeguards of a proposed federal
action could substantially reduce the public's anxiety factor. 63 In addi-
tion, greater awareness of environmental concerns would be promoted.
Finally, in order to educate the public, the agency proposing the imple-
mentation of any given action would be compelled to research more thor-
oughly and carefully each aspect of that proposal. Since the agency, as
decisionmaker, retains the power to make the ultimate determination, pub-
160. 678 F.2d at 234.
161. The NRC recently issued a policy statement construing PANE as limited to its own
facts. It interprets PANE as requiring three prerequisites to cognizability of psychological
stress impacts under NEPA: 1) "fears of recurring catastrophe" at the site in question caus-
ing 2) "post-traumatic anxieties" (not just "mere dissatisfaction with agency proposals or
policies") and accompanied by 3) physical effects. In addition, the NRC stressed that the
use of the word "catastrophe" indicates that only serious accidents qualify. In its opinion,
the only situation to date meeting these prerequisites is TMI-2. Policy Statement, 47 Fed.
Reg. 31,762 (1982).
162. See, e.g., Monarch Chert Works, Inc., 466 F. Supp. at 657.
163. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
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lic concern and input can only serve to make that decision more
enlightened.
Jill E. Homer
